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ABSTRACT: People obtain value, or gain utility, from procedures rather 
than merely from outcomes. Academic researchers are slowly and se-
lectively coming to terms with this fact, but it is neither sufficiently nor 
widely appreciated by actors in Hong Kong's political arena, whether at 
the center or on the periphery. The territory is grappling with the issue of 
democratic reform— both its pace and scope— but the heated exchanges 
between the proponents and the opponents of representative govern-
ment are confined to the outcome utility of the various constitutional 
proposals. It is essential to incorporate the procedural element into this 
incomplete picture. 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic change is normally accompanied by political change. Change in in-ternational status also usually carries political implications. The Hong Kong 
experience thus qualifies as the exception to the rule. Rapid economic growth, 
featuring deep structural transformation, has not been matched by significant 
political adjustments. By the same token, the shedding of colonial identity, fol-
lowing the transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to China, has not led 
to a meaningful enhancement of self-government and democratic representation. 
The political status quo remains largely intact—indeed, a retreat may have even 
taken place on a number of fronts. 
The rigidity on the supply side, or unwillingness of those in Beijing and Hong 
Kong in a position to control the pace of institutional reform to contemplate a 
decisive shift toward universal franchise, has provoked a harsh response on the 
demand side. The clamor for genuinely representative government has grown 
progressively stronger, often manifesting itself in group-specific and nearly 
community-wide acts of defiance and protest. The desire to secure unfettered 
political participation has clearly solidified at the grass-roots level, particularly 
among middle class professionals. 
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The imbalance between the supply side and the demand side has arguably 
resulted in strains within the overall system. As a result, Hong Kong may have 
consequently witnessed a "crisis of legitimacy," which, in turn, may have triggered 
a process of "political decay." The origins of the former may be traced to rising 
democratic aspirations in a complex urban environment, where the evolving social 
configuration is increasingly skewed toward the well-educated and cosmopolitan 
strata of society, against the backdrop of infringements of local autonomy by the 
post-1997 government of China. The lack of sensitivity displayed vis-a-vis these 
aspirations is viewed as a source of widespread criticism, in both direct and 
indirect form, regarding government institutions, and the policy establishment 
presiding over them.1 
Political decay is another symptom of "reverse democratization." It appar-
ently takes the shape of a material deterioration in government performance as 
evidenced, inter alia, by the adoption of a Third World-style personal rule at the 
apex of the executive branch, reliance on patron-client networks, politicization 
of the judiciary, cavalier attitude toward freedom in general and civil liberties 
in particular, indifference to public opinion, poor response to demands emanat-
ing from the grass-roots level, erratic policy formulation and implementation, 
symbolic manipulation and a propensity to play one segment of the community 
against another.2 
Government effectiveness may also be adversely affected by stress within 
the policy machinery, largely attributable to the incoherence characterizing 
the political reform process. This stress reflects a growing degree of organiza-
tional "disarticulation." Specifically, given that the set-up amounts to "neither 
parliamentary fish nor presidential fowl, the executive, the bureaucracy and 
the legislature (which is divided within itself) each pursue their own agenda, 
punctuated by occasional skirmishes in the boundaries of their domains and by 
subterranean campaigns to extend their jurisdictions."3 The reasons "lie in the 
factors behind the formal power arrangements embedded in the Basic Law on 
the one hand, and the domestic politics of the transition on the other, both of 
which left an indelible and incompatible imprint on the way in which institu-
tions actually work."4 
A disarticulated policy network cannot, by definition, function smoothly. 
Strategies formulated are unlikely to be marked by great depth, congruity, and 
consistency. Strategy implementation may pose an even more serious challenge 
because stimuli from the sources of policy initiative are bound to dissipate in the 
face of centrifugal pressures impairing execution channels. This scarcely qualifies 
as a favorable backdrop insofar as maximizing societal performance is concerned, 
even in an environment where the private sector enjoys considerable autonomy 
and remains large relative to its public counterpart. 
Un-accommodated demands for representative government are in themselves 
a sufficient cause for widespread disaffection at the grass-roots level. The dete-
rioration in the quality of strategic management inevitably intensifies the sense 
of malaise and despondency. A vicious circle unfolds whereby this sentiment 
prompts pro-democracy activists, both individually and collectively, to pursue 
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their goals in a form and on a scale that provokes a defensive and unproduc-
tive reaction on the part of the powers that be in Beijing and their "proxies" in 
Hong Kong. On the face of it, embracing universal franchise, sooner rather than 
later, and unambiguously rather than tentatively, appears to be the appropriate 
policy response to the imbalances that have emerged and the problems which 
they have spawned. 
There is another side to this complicated picture, however. Representative 
government is undoubtedly conducive to accountability (including transparency), 
equity, and freedom. The verdict regarding efficiency, an equally important stra-
tegic goal, is less favorable. Public choice theorists, particularly those conducting 
research in the area of constitutional economics, have compellingly highlighted, 
albeit not necessarily in an uncontroversial fashion, institutional "failures" com-
monly encountered in democratic settings. These failures are not confined to the 
supply side of the political arena (i.e., bureaucrats and elected officials) but also 
manifest themselves on the demand side (i.e., among voters).5 
Indeed, in economically mature yet otherwise, in certain crucial respects, 
shackled Hong Kong, the clamor for universal franchise, now rather than in the 
distant future, while strong, and increasingly so, has not extended across the entire 
societal spectrum. Some groups have not only refrained from providing active or 
tacit support but have voiced their objections to any hasty departures from the 
model of an "executive-led government." Subtle or not-so-subtle pressure from 
Beijing, as well as self-interest, may account for this stance, yet one has to acknowl-
edge that it selectively reflects a genuine concern about the potentially adverse 
impact of far-reaching and not measured democratization on the performance of 
the proverbial "goose that lays the golden egg" (i.e., efficiency).6 
The emotional intensity of the debate regarding the merits and demerits of dis-
mantling the vestiges of authoritarian rule is surprisingly high given the historical 
backdrop and geo-political constraints. It is thus interesting to note that the debate 
evolves within an analytical framework. Both sides across the political divide 
employ, whether explicitly or implicitly, utilitarian arguments. The proponents 
of representative government emphasize the connection between this progressive 
institutional configuration and values such as accountability (including, again, 
transparency), equity, and freedom. Those who prefer to cling to the status quo 
lay stress on its efficiency-enhancing attributes.7 
This dimension of the debate has been addressed in recent academic work, 
undertaken with a view to bringing the links between the competing systems 
of political management (democracy and consultative dictatorship; the instru-
mental variables) and the values which they supposedly reinforce into sharper 
focus.8 The studies completed do not remove all the conceptual ambiguities, but 
they arguably provide a clearer picture of the factors at play and the analytical 
structure binding them to each other. Nevertheless, the utilitarian logic used by 
the opposing ideological camps is incomplete, which detracts from the quality of 
the constitutional debate. The purpose of this paper is to identify a key missing 
element and suggest how it might be incorporated productively into the institu-
tional reform agenda. 
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THE RELEVANCE OF PROCEDURE 
Social scientists, particularly those pursuing research in the field of micro-
economics, have accorded considerable attention to the concept of "utility" since 
the advent of positivism in the 1930s. However, their application of the concept 
has largely been confined to outcomes. To state it more explicitly, they have chosen 
to view individual utility as the result of benefits and costs derived from instru-
mental outcomes. A powerful model of human behavior, albeit one resting on rather 
restrictive assumptions, has been constructed on this basis. 
Outcome-induced utility, if stripped of its more esoteric connotations, is 
an everyday phenomenon of great theoretical and practical importance which 
merits the consideration given to it by social scientists, both those drawn toward 
model-building and those with an interest in policy analysis. The validity of this 
observation notwithstanding, it is legitimate to argue that outcomes are not the 
sole source of individual utility. Specifically, human well-being is also affected by 
the procedural aspects of social dynamics (e.g., individuals involved in lawsuits 
are generally less reluctant to accept a given judgment, even distinctly unfavor-
able, when they regard the court procedures as fair).9 
The recognition that this is the case inevitably leads to the notion of "procedural 
utility," which implies that human well-being is a multi-dimensional construct not 
adequately represented through instrumental outputs in traditional-style economic 
utility functions. There is ample evidence to suggest that people care deeply about 
outcomes. At the same time, there is also evidence—not as quantitatively robust, 
because the work in this area is just beginning to gain momentum—supporting 
the idea that people also have preferences about how instrumental outcomes are 
generated. These preferences, in turn, give rise to procedural utility.10 
It is a moot point whether the distinction between outcome utility and pro-
cedural utility is entirely valid from a pure academic perspective. Procedural 
configurations have an extrinsic value which is perhaps fundamentally no dif-
ferent from that associated with "other" outcomes. Nevertheless, the distinction 
is useful from a policy standpoint because of the tendency of applied social 
scientists to focus narrowly on the material dimension of outcomes (particularly 
monetary benefits) and because empirically-generated findings—selectively 
surveyed here—suggest that it may be justified on cognitive grounds (i.e., people 
perceive procedures as separate from outcomes and value them accordingly). 
There are thus compelling practical reasons for de-coupling the procedural 
side of utility from the outcome one and highlighting the policy relevance of 
the former. 
The fine-tuning of the research agenda via a shift toward procedures is a 
healthy development for it allows us to equate utility broadly with well-being. It 
may thus be viewed as pleasure and pain, positive and negative sentiment, or 
life satisfaction. This should help to revive the original economic proposition that 
utility consists of everything that individuals value. Indeed, some of the research 
conducted recently in the field of behavioral economics directly addresses the 
reported subjective well-being, or happiness, experienced by actors operating in 
the economic arena.11 
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Procedural utility materializes because people have a sense of self. The concept 
incorporates a central tenet of social psychology into economics—namely, that 
people care about how they perceive themselves and how they are perceived by 
others.12 Procedural utility looms large in human functioning since procedures 
provide essential feedback information to the self by touching in various ways 
on the innate psychological needs of self-determination. Three such needs are 
deemed to be crucial by scholars working in this area: autonomy, relatedness, 
and competence.13 
The need for autonomy is rooted in the desire to organize one's own actions, or 
to be causal. The need for relatedness stems from the inclination to feel connected 
to others through love and care, and being treated as an accepted and respected 
member within social groups. And the need for competence has its origins in 
the propensity to control the environment and perceive oneself as capable and 
effective.14 Different procedures may act as the source of different "procedural 
goods" fulfilling these innate needs and contributing in the process to human 
well-being, whether or not they impinge on instrumental outcomes as narrowly 
conceptualized by social scientists.15 
An example might render this explanation more concrete. Thus, in a well-
known study, the researchers explored a situation where real-life litigants were 
involved in arbitration proceedings. At the end of the exercise, the court ordered 
an award, leaving the parties either to comply with the decision or reject it and 
opt for a trial.16 Social scientists, including those approaching the subject from a 
law-and-economics perspective, would traditionally examine such a situation by 
assessing the benefits and costs of accepting an award. 
Indeed, litigant behavior validated to some extent the assumptions underly-
ing this methodological position. Attitudes toward the court's decision were 
sensitive to instrumental outcomes such as the ratio between the actual award 
and the amount originally demanded, or the litigant's evaluation of whether the 
outcome was favorable or unfavorable (which could be viewed as a reasonable 
proxy for the expected net benefit of going to trial). Yet overall, the fairness of 
the arbitration procedure was found to be of greater importance for acceptance 
than instrumental outcomes.17 
This result may be attributed to the fact that procedures apparently convey 
crucial feedback information to the self, thereby affecting individuals' well-being. 
Procedures that are regarded as fair are often those that give participants in social 
processes an effective "voice." Being provided with an opportunity to express 
views about issues concerning oneself generates procedural utility because it 
addresses innate needs for dimensions of self-determination such as autonomy 
and competence. And, since it is a vital signal about one's standing in a group, it 
impinges on innate needs of relatedness.18 
Procedural utility is determined by many factors—economic, legal, organi-
zational, political, and social—but it is convenient to group them into two broad 
categories. First, there is the procedural utility people gain from institutions as 
such. At the macro level, the principal institutional mechanisms for facilitating 
decision making are bargaining, democracy, hierarchy, and the price system/ 
market.19 People may derive procedural utility from these institutions because 
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they affect their fundamental needs. For example, a constitution that safeguards 
civil liberties such as the freedom of speech may contribute tangibly to people's 
self-worth. On the other hand, a constitution that denies certain groups their legiti-
mate political rights may undermine people's sense of self, its instrumental value 
notwithstanding. Institutions thus have a direct bearing on human well-being by 
addressing innate needs of autonomy, relatedness, and competence.20 
Second, procedural utility is the inevitable product of the interaction between 
people. Participants in social processes assess actions directed toward them not 
just by the consequences, but also by their perceptions regarding the manner 
in which they are treated by others. This manner is shaped to a considerable 
extent by institutions which provide incentives, both directly and indirectly, 
for people in exchange relationships to treat each other in certain ways in most 
social situations. To illustrate, labor law and company statutes exert strong 
influence over the interaction between managers and employees. The corollary 
is that institutions also have a more complex link to human well-being due to 
the role they play in motivating and restricting people's actions vis-a-vis each 
other (hence qualifying as a key determinant of the sense of self from a micro 
perspective as well).21 
At this stage of Hong Kong's constitutional evolution, close attention should 
be accorded to procedural utility obtained from democratic participation. There 
is a voluminous literature suggesting that this is an activity which provides 
people with a distinctly positive experience in a variety of cultural settings.22 
The rights to participate in political decisions are a vital ingredient of any 
democratic constitutional configuration. They range from voting in elections, 
and launching and exercising voice through referenda, to running for a seat 
in the legislature. Citizens may gain procedural utility from such participation 
rights over and above the outcome generated in the political process because 
they enhance the sense of empowerment/autonomy, inclusion/relatedness, and 
effectiveness / competence.23 
In a recent study, an attempt was made to ascertain in highly specific terms 
the procedural utility enjoyed by virtue of people being able to avail themselves 
of meaningful political participation rights. The researchers focused on the dif-
ferences in status between nationals and foreigners. The former have the right 
to vote and access the political arena through other channels, while the latter 
cannot vote and have virtually no room for political maneuver. Nationals should 
thus derive more satisfaction from political participation rights than foreigners 
because of the procedural means at their disposal—a hypothesis that was tested 
in the Swiss context.24 
Switzerland was chosen for this purpose for it is a country where one finds a 
remarkably high degree of variation in the political participation rights among 
citizens. In addition to elections, they can make use of direct democratic instru-
ments (grass-root initiatives, referenda), which differ significantly from one 
canton to another. As a proxy measure for utility, an index of reported subjective 
well-being was employed to test the hypothesis. It is interesting to note that the 
overall utility effect from more comprehensive political participation rights, as 
reflected in reported satisfaction with life, was quite substantial.25 
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Citizens, as well as foreigners, living in jurisdictions with more developed 
political participation rights apparently fare considerably better in terms of their 
subjective well-being. However, the positive effect on reported satisfaction with 
life turned out to be much more modest for foreigners, a result attributable to 
their exclusion from the political process (the positive effect of participation 
rights was about three times larger for citizens than for foreigners, implying that 
procedural utility was a crucial factor in the psychological equation). The picture 
remained intact when several correlates of subjective well-being (particularly 
socio-demographic characteristics, employment status and household income) 
were controlled for.26 
The issue of the procedural utility (or disutility!) obtained from a top-down 
policy management style (the term "executive-led government" perhaps does not 
fully capture the essence of this institutional pattern) should also be incorporated 
into Hong Kong's evolving constitutional agenda. The behavioral theories relied 
upon throughout this paper suggest that people prefer independence to being 
subject to hierarchical decision making. Specifically, hierarchy may be viewed as 
a source of procedural disutility because it undermines the innate needs of self-
determination: autonomy and competence cannot be exercised effectively when 
authority flows from the top layers of the organizational structure to their bottom 
counterparts, and relatedness is also hindered in such circumstances.27 
There is considerable empirical evidence to support this assertion. One study 
stands out in that respect for it addresses explicitly the relationship between hier-
archy and procedural utility. The researchers involved sought to capitalize on the 
fact that earnings can basically be generated through two channels: a hierarchy (as 
an employee) and independently (as a self-employed person). Using individual 
panel data from Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, they established 
that self-employed people secure greater utility from their work (measured via 
job satisfaction) than employees, even if highly relevant instrumental outcomes 
such as the pay level and working hours are controlled for.28 
Another dimension of procedural utility which merits consideration in the 
current constitutional climate in Hong Kong is its link to due process. Pertinent 
insights are available across the social science spectrum, but those originating in the 
field of organizational studies are probably the most useful. Here, researchers con-
sistently report that concerns for procedural fairness play a pivotal role in shaping 
the employment relationship. Procedural aspects identified as important include 
organizational policies and rules (e.g., providing advance notice for decisions and 
opportunities for voice), but they also extend to the interpersonal treatment of 
people. Again, the findings are consistent with the notion that participants in social 
processes value fair procedures over and above organizational outcomes.29 
Due process needs to be examined in the broader context of the rule of law, 
in general and in the present Hong Kong constitutional context in particular. 
Indeed, this is an area where procedural fairness has been explored in a very 
thorough fashion. Many behaviorally-oriented legal scholars draw the conclu-
sion that people react adversely to unfair procedures, regardless of the objective 
judgment made by a court of law. Perceived procedural unfairness consistently 
prompts individuals to rate the legitimacy of authorities and their satisfaction 
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with a trial as fairly low and, rather interestingly, it also influences subsequent 
compliance behavior.30 
One study has already been outlined because of its wider ramifications, but 
it may be desirable to highlight that work again because of its real-life focus. As 
noted, the researchers who undertook the investigation explored the acceptance of 
awards from court-ordered arbitration by actual litigants. Those involved included 
corporate entities and individuals engaged in litigation at federal-level American 
courts. The researchers observed that litigants who viewed the arbitration process 
as fair were much more likely to accept the court-ordered award (irrespective of 
the objective outcome).31 
The decision whether to opt for a formal trial was driven most strongly by 
procedural fairness factors. This is remarkable, as the disputes considered had 
far-reaching financial implications (with the amount of money at stake as high 
as U.S. $800,000). The objective size of the award and other instrumental vari-
ables also predicted acceptance, but to a much lesser extent. The findings thus 
demonstrate that utility from procedures plays a role in lawsuits over and above 
outcome utility.32 
The issues of democratic participation (at least in the form associated with 
representative government), policy management style (top-down versus bottom-
up, or a mixture of the two), due process and the rule of law loom large on Hong 
Kong's constitutional agenda. Moreover, social science research has reached a 
critical mass and has solid empirical underpinnings.33 Nevertheless, the debate 
regarding constitutional progress, its complexity and intensity notwithstanding, is 
not properly grounded in the logic of procedural utility. By the same token, social 
science capabilities are not productively employed to enhance the understanding 
of public attitudes vis-a-vis strategic elements of the territory's procedural edifice. 
Given the prevailing conceptual ambiguities and ideological strains, it is essential 
to take steps toward reversing this trend. 
STRIKING A BALANCE 
The position adopted in this paper, while reflecting serious concerns and deep 
convictions, is not necessarily one that leads to the conclusion that procedural 
utility is the sole relevant factor in all circumstances or that it overshadows every 
other part of the picture. One should acknowledge that the distinction between 
procedure and outcome cannot always be readily drawn, both in theory and in 
practice. Economists thus normally express a preference for markets as allocation 
mechanisms, not just because markets seem to produce better outcomes than the 
alternatives (at least in terms of efficiency and freedom), but also because markets 
institutionalize a favored treatment of trading partners in interaction.34 
Admittedly, some social philosophers evaluate procedures without any refer-
ence to the outcomes they produce. A libertarian such as Nozick is a prominent 
example. In his dissection of "right rules," personal liberties and rights of property 
are accorded such a high intrinsic value that any outcomes associated with them 
have no material bearing on the evaluation.35 However, even those who embrace 
this perspective cannot overlook the possibility that the consequences of such 
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procedurally robust social order might prove to be extremely costly ("it can be 
shown tha t . . . gigantic famines can actually take place in an economy that fulfills 
all the libertarian rights and entitlements specified in the Nozick system").36 
There are, hence, good reasons for taking procedural and outcome variables 
simultaneously into account when confronting constitutional choices. This may 
complicate matters because the two sets do not always reinforce each other. In 
the case of democratic participation rights, the procedure seems to produce posi-
tive procedural utility as well as better outcomes (subject to certain analytical 
qualifications and institutional adjustments).37 In other circumstances, procedure 
and outcome at times propel the decision-making system in different directions. 
Whenever this happens to be the prevailing pattern, there is inevitably a trade-
off between procedural and outcome concerns. The participants in Hong Kong's 
constitutional debate should be able to rise to the challenge, provided they rec-
ognize that procedural utility is a vital component of the modern policy maker's 
conceptual apparatus. 
There are no tangible signs that a shift in this direction is about to materialize. 
As matters stand, a large and affluent metropolis, boasting a sophisticated physical 
and institutional infrastructure, and defining and promoting itself as "Asia's world 
city," is deeply divided over whether and when to embrace democracy. Cracks 
are also beginning to appear in the political facade regarding the commitment to 
due process and the rule of law. Those extolling the merits of the executive-led 
government model in its traditional form express misgivings about the risks to 
"prosperity" and "stability" (the local equivalent of efficiency) stemming from 
rapid political liberalization and overly constrained public authority. Those at 
the opposite end of the ideological spectrum counter by highlighting the adverse 
impact on the socio-economic system of practices that undermine accountability, 
equity, and freedom. The picture is drawn by actors employing mostly the vocabu-
lary of outcome utility. To restore a modicum of balance, these vexed constitutional 
issues should also be approached from a procedural perspective. 
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